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From an overview of the current state of the global debate on human rights, the need 
to strike a balance between the transcendent and immanent dimensions of such rights 
claims is distilled as an important guideline. The implications of such a balance are 
spelled out in a list of seven principles that should guide the activation of human rights 
claims in any context. In the second section of the article this general framework is 
brought to bear on the serious issue of sexual violence against women in the South 
African postcolony. I argue that at least one of the reasons for the fundamental un-
freedom of women in contemporary South Africa is the clash between two dominant, 
but opposing frameworks that tend to quash the radical potential that a claim to 
the fundamental right to bodily integrity holds for women. Strategically, it is vitally 
important that human rights activism be used to bolster this cause in the South 
African context. This should, however, be done very consciously and explicitly with 
the various dangers for perversion and co-optation, as spelled out in this article, 
firmly in mind. Ideally, feminist thinkers and activists should forge solidarity around 
a critical, transcendent claim to bodily bolstered integrity as strongly as possible by 
indigenous traditions of women’s resistance to oppression and exploitation. Such a 
claim should be mobilised for an internal critique of the master narrative of South 
African liberation. Such a stance will resist and refuse both dominant frameworks that 
collaborate – despite their overt mutual opposition – to portray African tradition and 
identity as irredeemably patriarchal. 
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1. Introduction
This article investigates whether human rights discourse, and international 
frameworks and legal developments could and should be used as a lever to 
support African women’s struggles for greater sexual freedom and autonomy. 
The first section of the article gives an overview of the current state of the 
global debate on the advantages and potential benefits, as well as the numerous 
obstacles and problems with human rights discourse, particularly when these are 
invoked in postcolonial contexts. This overview is focused on demonstrating that 
the central paradox of human rights traditions can be understood in terms of the 
tension within human rights claims between the immanent and the transcendent 
dimensions, or between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, or between fact and ideal. I argue 
that the paradoxical and, in many instances, contradictory moments detectable 
in human rights struggles are neither contingent nor fully avoidable. Since the 
radical emancipatory potential of human rights lies precisely in their ability to 
critique what is, and to keep alive the promise of a better world, this tension 
should be kept alive. I furthermore show that violence (whether perpetrated by 
pro- or anti-human rights groups) is the closing down of this fruitful tension, 
an immanentisation of rights, which kills its promise. By listening to different 
thinkers’ various concerns about the use of human rights, I also start to show 
in this section how human rights claims can best be drawn upon in the struggle 
for African women’s sexual freedoms. Seven important themes in this regard are 
crystallised in conclusion. 
The second section of this article is devoted to considering South African 
women’s ongoing struggle for sexual freedom. The real contribution of the 
article lies in this section, in which I bring the ‘lessons’ learnt from criticisms of 
human rights claims in the international arena to bear on this specific issue in the 
South African postcolony. I first discuss, in broad strokes, the actual treatment 
of international human rights by the newly created South African Constitutional 
Court, and I lament the fact that the watershed verdict of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) declaring war rape as a crime 
against humanity in 2001 has not found stronger resonance in our sexual 
offences legal reform process. I show further that the same paradox identified in 
the global debate on human rights is at work in our local context, and I analyse 
this tension through the lens of monumental versus memorial moments of 
constitutional interpretation in South Africa. Taken to their logical extremes, both 
these moments tend to quash the promise embodied in the new Constitution, and 
thus they need to be kept in balance. However, in the case of women’s sexual 
autonomy, instead of a fruitful or productive tension between the monumental 
and memorial moments of constitutional interpretation, we find that two violent, 
but opposing frameworks reinforce each other in order to resist women’s claims. 
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 Thus I conclude that, while the current profile of human rights works against the 
creation of an indigenous feminist call for an end to sexual violence, the power 
of human rights or something like them remains an indispensable tool for African 
women’s fight for sexual liberation. 
2. Paradox keeps human rights alive
2.1 Douzinas and the ‘fight for transcendence in immanence’
Human rights discourse remains paradoxical to the core. In Part 1 of his book, 
Human rights and empire: the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism, 
Costas Douzinas (2007: 8) “explores the paradoxical ways in which the ideal, 
transcendent position of natural law and human rights has been reversed turning 
them into tools of public power and individual desire”. When these rights, 
expressed as a corrective ideal, lose their transcendent character, they soon 
function ideologically. As Douzinas views it, currently the two main ideological 
uses of human rights discourse entail “public power”, mostly state and imperial 
power, and “individual desire” by which he refers to the colonisation of rights 
talk by capitalist power where rights typically get reduced to, and perverted into 
the satisfaction of individual and private desires. With the current rapid rise of a 
new middle class in postcolonial Africa and South Africa, corruption, conspicuous 
consumption of the leading classes, and the growing gap between rich and 
poor, the latter form of perversion of the liberation and anti-colonial struggle 
has become particularly salient in this context. In his earlier The end of human 
rights, Douzinas (2000) claimed starkly “human rights have only paradoxes to 
offer” and, in the later book, he goes even further, stating, “[t]he paradoxical, the 
aporetic, the contradictory are not peripheral distractions awaiting to be ironed 
out by the theorist. Paradox is the organising principle of human rights” (Douzinas 
2007: 8). We should thus not expect that human rights could be invoked in any 
cause or context without the danger of their perversion being present. 
Indeed, from Douzinas’ overview of the history of natural and human rights, 
it becomes exceedingly clear that the driving impulse behind such claims or 
assertions throughout history has been the attempt to critique and oppose the 
immanent and totalising power of state or empire, in particular in so far as these 
structures drew their authority from custom and tradition (Douzinas 2007: 12). 
Such contestatory claims constituted appeals to various elements, including to 
nature, to God or to human reason or human nature as supposedly transcendent 
sources beyond the current power dispensation. Nature, God or Reason, believed 
to ground or found human rights, were seen as proclaiming ‘higher’, timeless, 
supra-cultural moral laws that could be successfully evoked in order to resist 
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local custom and to explode totalitarian, closed systems of power. Proponents 
of such claims were thus, in effect, searching for some authoritative ‘thing’ or 
some ‘place’ external to the instituted and established order from where critique 
on the bounded, self-grounding and self-reinforcing whole could be leveraged. 
In practice, then, “[h]uman rights are part of a long and honourable tradition of 
dissent, resistance and rebellion against the oppression of power and the injustice 
of law” (Douzinas 2007: 13). This tradition rested on assumptions of access to 
some form of higher moral authority. 
Yet, paradoxically, and as regularly as human rights have been invoked in 
the struggle for greater freedom or justice, they have also been appropriated to 
bolster absolute sovereignty in the immanent powers they set out to resist. Rights 
claims and their particular moral force has since its inception been “usurped 
by those against whom they were supposed to be a defence”, states Douzinas 
(2007: 13). Rights claims have thus been used in justifications of capitalist 
expansion, bourgeois interests and, increasingly, of invasive, neo-colonial wars. 
Some of the most glaring recent examples concern US justifications of their 
military attacks on Middle Eastern states in the name of women’s rights. And 
so, for Douzinas (2007: 13), “the radical potential of right [is] both revealed and 
concealed in human rights”. Umut Özsu (2008: 863), in his review of Douzinas’ 
Human rights and empire, describes this structural ambivalence at the heart of 
human rights as the “unique ability of rights discourse to shuffle back and forth 
between the vitality of modernity’s promise and the violence of its practice”. The 
two most prominent problematic aspects of current human rights discourse that 
need addressing for Douzinas are their implication in “the projects of colonialism 
and imperialism [the ideological gloss of emerging empire] in which they have 
been affiliated” and the “stultifying processes of commodification to which they 
continue to be subjected” (Özsu 2008: 863).
How to do this? For Douzinas, the answer to this dilemma entails that “the 
work of critique must be grounded in a commitment to safeguard the distance 
between the utopian promise and current profile of human rights”, in other words, 
between transcendence and immanence (Özsu 2008: 863). This means that 
intellectual and activist critique “has to remain both mindful of and faithful to the 
need ‘to discover and fight for transcendence in immanence’” (Özsu 2008: 863). 
When struggles for greater freedom for oppressed peoples depend on keeping 
alive the transcendent claim (longing, protest, refusal) within the immanent 
context, then one can understand why Douzinas sees violence as constituting the 
opposite move of the “closing down or forgetting of the gap” (2007: 287). Violence 
closes the gap with the assertion that the actual or the real in some preferred 
form actually corresponds with the ideal. It is clear that such a claim, this type 
of violence, may just as easily take the form of a rejection as of an appropriation 
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 of human rights discourse. It is not an exaggeration to say that these are the 
two most prevalent forms that armed violence currently assumes. For Douzinas, 
what these two globalised, opposing, forms of violence share is a resolute erasure 
of the transcendent nature of human rights claims. Whether they are pro- or 
anti-human rights, they curtail the idealistic dimension, and thus close down the 
utopian promise of human rights at their best. Put simplistically, the one side 
claims to represent and embody human rights, and the other combats human 
rights coached in its own particular version of such an incarnated, immanent 
form of human rights. By reducing and solidifying human rights in superficially 
opposed ways, both sides in fact collaborate to destroy what is most radical, most 
promising and most powerful about them. This is namely that they can open up 
radically new possibilities in stultified cultural environments such as the religious 
and patriarchal fundamentalisms often underlying both these dominant forms 
of globalised violence. Advocates of human rights should therefore work to keep 
open and emphasise the gap, the difference between positive law (immanence) 
and the ideals of justice (transcendence). In contrast to violence thus conceived, 
critique entails “care for the distance, the cultivation of its memory and possibility” 
(Douzinas 2007: 287).
2.2 The need for a thin conception of human rights
With this emphasis on the need to care for the distance and to cultivate the 
memory and possibility (promise) of the gap between immanent and transcendent, 
Douzinas seems to place a special emphasis on an aspect of human rights discourse 
to which he referred earlier in his analysis of the necessary vagueness of human 
rights: “the ‘human’ in human rights is a floating signifier; ‘human rights’ is a 
thin, underdetermined concept” (Douzinas 2007: 8). A central aspect of their 
apparent vagueness is the fact that human rights claims are moral claims made 
by individuals or groups that may or may not be recognised by the particular legal 
system in, or against which they are made (Douzinas 2007: 9). Human rights 
discourse thus has an undeniably moral dimension that aims to limit and shape 
political and legal power by stating in descriptive language what ‘ought to be’ the 
case. In contexts where human rights claims are most persistently made, they 
are likely to be least acknowledged; there is clearly something deeply paradoxical 
when a black South African under apartheid claims that she has ‘a human right 
to moral equality and dignity’. Her claim amounts to a metaphorical (figurative, 
imaginative) one in which she claims that she possesses something because she 
does not possess it; she simultaneously does and does not have moral equality 
and dignity. As Douzinas (2007: 10) explains, “right” in this sense clearly does 
not refer to any kind of “positive or legally enforceable right [but rather] to a 
claim about what morality demands”, in contrast with the positive law. As such, 
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it amounts to an aspirational claim or a call for reform of the current legal and 
political system. Such a claim would only have power in a context where there 
is a chance of its being heard or received by some sympathetic audience, even 
if that audience is located elsewhere, outside of the narrow context. The same 
claim would have had (did have) resonance in South Africa in the 1980s, since 
there would have (and was) resonance internationally, but no such resonance in 
the South Africa of the nineteenth century, for instance.
In addition, for human rights champion Michael Ignatieff, the emphasis in 
human rights should fall on the ethical and moral dimension, but then more 
specifically on the negative moral category of cruelty. In 2001, Ignatieff delivered 
the Tanner Lecture Series called ‘Human rights as politics and idolatry’, in which 
he considered and responded to the best known criticisms of the international 
human rights framework. These included the allegations that
human rights are vague and unenforceable; [...] they are more 
symbolic than substantive; they cannot be grounded in any 
ontological truth or philosophical principle; in their primordial 
individualism, they conflict with cultural integrity [...]; they are a 
guise in which superpower global domination drapes itself; they 
are a guise in which the globalization of capital drapes itself [...] 
(see Brown 2004: 451).
In response to these objections, Ignatieff defends a negative and minimalist 
conception of human rights. He believes human rights may be grounded more 
securely in the notion of cruelty than in any supposedly shared notion of what 
constitutes the good for humans. Here he follows the intuition of his teacher, 
Judith Shklar, who claimed that it is easier to reach universal and transcultural 
consensus on what is bad about human suffering intentionally inflicted (cruelty 
as a crime against the deep-seated human capacity for compassion) than about 
what is the good life. Ignatieff’s conception of human rights is thus negative, in 
the sense that he claims that we should “put cruelty first” and use human rights 
instruments merely to “stop unmerited suffering and gross physical cruelty [... 
such as] torture, beatings, killings, rape, and assault” (Ignatieff 2001: 173). It is 
minimalist in a sense that is closely connected with its negativity: for Ignatieff, 
human rights should not prescribe the good or the right, but rather fight against 
what we can all (universally, presumably) agree on to be unequivocally evil or 
wrong. In other words, the universality of human rights is “compatible with a 
wide variety of ways of living [with many different cultures and world views] 
only if the universalism implied is self-consciously minimalist [... and] a decidedly 
‘thin’ theory of what is right, a definition of the minimum conditions for any kind 
of life at all” (Ignatieff 2001: 56-7).
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 One can see here an attempt to ground human rights in some transcendent, 
supra-personal and, at the same time, minimalist account of what human life 
requires to be worth living. Douzinas would probably criticise Ignatieff’s strategy 
as merely another attempt to reduce and then fix the meaning of human rights, 
which goes against their grain; what the two thinkers share is an insistence upon 
a ‘thin’ conception of right.
2.3 The political dimension of human rights
Wendy Brown (2004) criticises another aspect of Ignatieff’s argument, in that 
she views his emphasis on the moral dimension of human rights (focused only 
on cruelty and suffering) as ultimately a refusal to acknowledge the political 
dimension in which, against which and from which human rights claims 
inevitably operate. Although Brown agrees that human rights claims necessarily 
couch themselves in moral (extra-legal or transcendent) language, she is also 
concerned that human rights activists (and, increasingly, bureaucrats), in the 
process of doing so, dangerously deny or ignore the inevitably political dimension 
of their work: 
What are the implications of human rights assuming center 
stage as an international justice project, or as the progressive 
international justice project? Human rights activism is a moral-
political project and if it displaces, competes with, refuses, or 
rejects other political projects, including those aimed at producing 
justice, then it is [...] a particular form of political power carrying 
a particular image of justice, and it will behove us to inspect, 
evaluate, and judge it as such (Brown 2004: 453).
Human rights claims, in their attempt to retain their universal thrust, are 
often couched in impossibly abstract (‘thin’) terms such as the entitlement of 
each individual to moral equality or in terms of their stand against the immorality 
of politically induced suffering (Brown 2004: 453). If they remain on this level 
of abstraction, they are irrelevant for people’s political struggles. Yet, the 
moment that activists try to promote these principles in any concrete context, 
that is, to say what it means in context for people to have moral equality, the 
force and efficacy (if any) of such principles is dependent on taking on some 
decidedly political dimension. Brown’s example in this regard is the supposedly 
‘humanitarian’ intervention in Iraq by the US and Britain, where the local people 
simply ‘traded one form of subjection for another’. The power to interpret what 
human rights could or should mean in those contexts was not worked out within 
the contexts themselves. Brown says that any ‘moral’ intervention seems unable 
to refrain from being at the same time a political intervention. 
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Posing as a type of “merely moral” anti-politics, the political effect of “liberal 
individualist” humanitarian interventions like these for Brown is that they do 
not empower individuals as political actors and autonomous agents, but rather 
“[cast] subjects as yearning to be free of politics, and, indeed, of all collective 
determinations of ends” (Brown 2004: 456). Add to this Sylvia Tamale’s (2008: 
52) observation that “first-world” feminists often represent “third-world” women 
as helpless victims of their cultures, and as “objects devoid of any agency” and 
one gets an even stronger sense of how human rights interventions from afar 
may both deny and stunt political, interpretative agency in their ‘humanitarian’ 
interventions. In this way, the human rights flag carried by the (sometimes war) 
ship of liberal individualism may, in fact, announce and promote the end of 
politics, struggle, and resistance, in a gesture of ultimate self-refutation. Douzinas 
(2007: 6-7) formulates this paradoxical effect more strongly: “the ‘victories for 
freedom and democracy’ in Afghanistan and Iraq [...] have been drowned in a 
human rights disaster for the local people”.
And so, like Douzinas, Brown also concludes that human rights are inherently 
much more paradoxical than Ignatieff acknowledges, especially in their political 
effects and concrete manifestations: “[a]s such, [rights] are not simply rules and 
defenses against power, but can themselves be tactics and vehicles of governance 
and domination [… they] can simultaneously shield subjects from certain abuses 
and become tactics in their disempowerment” (Brown 2004: 459). She adds 
succinctly: “there is no such thing as mere reduction of suffering or protection 
from abuse – the nature of the reduction or protection is itself productive of 
political subjects and political possibilities” (Brown 2004: 460). One could add 
that suffering itself never constitutes a brute fact. It is instead always embedded 
in a context whose interpretation and meaning are politically contested. To see 
this one should only consider the media spectacles of suffering created with the 
aim to justify certain wars and aspirations and to condemn others. Consider the 
dearth of images of suffering that do not serve the most powerful political agendas 
(Guantánamo Bay, victims of the US military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Israel’s brutal practices of occupation, supported by the US) to understand to 
what extent our grasp of the global distribution of suffering is mediated politically, 
financially, ideologically, and otherwise.1 
It might seem on the face of it as if Douzinas and Brown are pulling in opposite 
directions, with the former emphasising the need to retain the transcendence of 
human rights (to heed the ‘gap’ between the real and the ideal) in order to avoid 
becoming ideologically subservient, and the latter emphasising that human rights 
1 In this regard, consider Judith Butler’s (2003, 2009) notion of “grievable lives” and the work of 
Dubravka Zarkov 2007.
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 only ever become effective politically, and that to claim otherwise is likely to serve 
ideological purposes. Yet I would suggest, following thinkers like Debra Bergoffen, 
Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell,2 that by coming at the issue from different sides, 
Douzinas and Brown are highlighting the need to keep alive the paradox at the 
heart of human rights. Brown emphasises the violence that is likely to follow if 
the immanent, political dimension of human rights is ignored; Douzinas draws 
attention to the violence that results from forgetfulness about the transcendent, 
moral dimension of human rights. Cornell explains this paradox by drawing a key 
distinction between the concept of justice and any particular conception of justice, 
arguing that “the concept of justice [cannot] be fully realized in a conception of 
justice” (Cornell 1995: 14). Yet, for any conception of justice to retain its force, it 
should draw energy and inspiration from the concept of justice. It is on the level 
of the conception of justice that both African (and other postcolonial) thinkers 
and feminists “demand greater room for political contestation” (Cornell 1995: 
14). Such contestation is always in principle possible because, for Cornell (1995: 
16), justice is a “limit principle”: “[j]ustice is not something to be achieved, it is 
[rather] something to be struggled for”. Similarly, Douzinas (2007: 13) states, 
“Every exercise of right, every rearrangement of social hierarchy, opens in turn a 
new vista, which, if petrified, becomes itself an external limitation that must be 
again overcome”. Judith Butler (2001: 430) argues along the same lines, saying:
What is permitted within the term universal is understood to be 
dependent on a consensus [and …] presumes that what will and 
will not be included in the language of universal entitlement is 
not settled once and for all, that its future shape cannot be fully 
anticipated at this time. 
It is clear that for these thinkers, the universal should be kept radically 
undecidable, “transcendent”, in Douzinas’ terms. Butler also wants to protect 
the ideal or promise expressed in the universal aspiration of human rights, and 
she counter-intuitively approaches this task by insisting that we remember 
precisely the particularity of its historical emergence. She calls this a performative 
contradiction: by remembering the concrete, particular, specific, historical roots 
and contexts of the emergence and revision of any universalising concept, any 
particular expression of justice, one keeps alive its core meaning, namely the way 
in which it emerges in protest and refusal to what is. This would ideally remind us 
of the possibility that it may and, in fact, must always be interpreted anew, that 
the critical-hermeneutical task of deciding what the political thrust of human 
rights should be in any given context is never exhausted. This is also why Butler 
2 The discussion over the next two paragraphs is closely modelled on, and draws freely from an 
article I have published elsewhere (see Du Toit 2013).
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aligns the universal with the “not yet”, with “that which remains unrealised”, 
and its articulation with challenges to its existing formulations (Butler 2001: 431, 
as discussed in Bergoffen 2003: 125). Bergoffen (2003: 125) notes that Butler 
resists “align[ing] the universal with an absolute unerring content”, and does 
not ignore, but rather draws attention to “the disjunction between the specificity 
of the content and the claim to universality”, which is a necessary and ever-
present disjunction, a tension that should at all costs be kept alive. Bergoffen 
detects a similarity between Butler’s “politics of hope and anxiety” and Derrida’s 
(1997: 29) “democracy of the perhaps” and sees them as linking “the possibility 
of justice to a thinking that frees the thought of the future from its betrayal […] 
by already determined concepts of universality” (Bergoffen 2003: 126). Bergoffen 
(2003: 125) formulates this concern very well:
Dethroned from their position as absolute Platonic realities, 
universals become embedded in material realities – sites where 
the tension between the specificity of those articulating the 
universal appeal and the absolute resolution articulated in the 
particulars of the appeal become politically productive.
The next section is devoted to bringing this international, philosophical debate 
on the nature, status and structure of human rights to the current South African 
context, and to asking how human rights discourse could or should function 
in women’s struggles for sexual freedom. In particular, by keeping in mind the 
themes that have crystallised in this section, the question to be answered is how 
could or should human rights frameworks and claims be made productive in 
South Africa, in fighting for African women’s sexual autonomy and freedoms? The 
themes to be kept firmly in mind include protecting human rights claims against 
their usurpation and monopolisation by state power; protecting human rights 
claims against their usurpation and monopolisation by imperial powers such as 
the US and others; protecting human rights claims against being co-opted into 
a capitalist frame which reduces them to individual need satisfaction; keeping 
alive the transcendent claim or dimension of human rights; neither negating 
nor avoiding the political dimension of human rights, which is closely linked to 
the need for local contestations over what specific human rights such as bodily 
integrity should mean in particular contexts; maintaining the ‘human’ in human 
rights as a thin concept and thus actively challenging ideological understandings 
of the human ‘from below’, for example, where humanity or dignity is conflated 
with middle-class existence or male embodiment, and similarly, preserving the 
proposed thinness of human rights conceptions and safeguarding the distance 
between the concept and the conception of justice by resisting interpretations of 
human rights claims that are overtly individualistic or abstract and that thereby 
threaten cultural integrity. A golden thread running through most of these themes 
58   Acta Academica / 2014:4
 is the need for South African women to work out for and among themselves what 
transcendent human rights principles such as bodily integrity could and should 
mean within local places, and then to find or create responsive audiences both 
inside and outside the country to help exert pressure on governmental and other 
structures to rearrange power relations within the young state in order to improve 
the protection of women’s and girls’ sexual integrity.
3. Sexual freedom in the postcolony
3.1 Women’s sexual rights as human rights
The previous section showed how feminist theorists such as Bergoffen, Butler and 
Cornell cautiously adopt and adapt human rights discourses to be used in specific 
struggles, thereby emphasising the need for such discourses to be activated. On 
the one hand they suggested that we cannot today do without the universalising 
and transcendent moral claims emanating from these discourses and on 
the other they showed that this can only happen if their concrete application 
remains eternally open to fresh and competing interpretations, i.e. in Douzinas’ 
terminology, if they resist the violence of closure. They want the content, but also 
the structure and status of human rights discourse to remain open to political 
contestation. As soon as the universalising thrust or aspiration gets bogged 
down by being equated with something like individual desire, satisfaction, public 
power, imperialist interests or even liberal individualist feminism, it becomes 
self-defeating. In the limited space available here, I want to briefly consider what 
this critical appropriation of human rights discourse may imply for (South) African 
women’s struggle for sexual freedom.
Although it is possible to make a convincing argument that South African 
men’s sexual freedoms are also not optimally realised, my focus is on the sexual 
un-freedom of women and girls in the country. With an annual South African 
Police Service rape report rate of 66 000 and apparently still on the increase, 
and with over 40% of the victims of rape being under the age of 18 (Jewkes et al. 
2009), the impact of actual and threatened sexual violence severely violates 
women’s sexual freedom as well as many other of their most basic freedoms 
guaranteed in our Bill of Rights such as freedom from violence, the right to bodily 
integrity, freedom of movement, and so on.3 Moreover, I would argue that these 
cruelties are not generally framed as grievable under our current dispensation. 
Now and then a particularly cruel or sensational rape or rape-and-murder grabs 
the media headlines: think of baby Tshepang from Upington, Anene Booysen from 
3 <http://rapecrisis.org.za/rape-in-south-africa/>
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Bredasdorp, and Ina Bonnett, victim of the ‘Monster of Modimolle’. Yet, if one 
considers the actual numbers of victims involved – approximately 180 reported 
cases per day – then it is clear that the phenomenon does not receive the high-
level political and public response that it deserves. South African society seems 
to be mainly reconciled with, and thus complicit in sexual violence as firmly 
woven into the daily fabric of our lives. One could thus reasonably expect that 
international and human rights frameworks can and should be more strongly 
enforced or applied within the South African legal and governing systems, 
regarding this issue. But in light of the concerns around human and international 
legal frameworks explored earlier, how could this be done?
When these questions are raised, it should be noted that there has been 
an intensification and expansion of international attention to sexual violence, 
especially after the February 2001 verdict in the Kunarac case of the ICTY 
(see Bergoffen 2003). In this instance, three men were sentenced for war 
rape, condemned by the Tribunal as a war crime as well as a crime against 
humanity. It was the first time in history that war rape had been condemned 
and sentenced internationally as such a severe crime. Bergoffen’s extensive 
analyses of this watershed verdict show that its power was derived from political 
pressure mounted by lobby groups on the issue of war rape around the world 
in the wake of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995; 
the retention of the transformative, transcendent and aspirational thrust carried 
by the vocabulary of ‘crimes against humanity’ and, importantly, the openness 
of the Tribunal to allowing its understanding of the ‘human’ in human rights to 
be informed and finally changed by women’s testimonies about war rape, i.e. 
‘from below’. Bergoffen (2012) demonstrates the latter by showing how a certain 
interpretation of women’s sex-specific vulnerabilities to rape was incorporated 
into the Tribunal’s definition of the ‘human’ in human rights at the cost of the 
traditional, invulnerable and heroic idealised male body.
In my view these developments in international and human rights law should 
have more profoundly affected our domestic frameworks for dealing with sexual 
violence than they finally did. It is a pity that they did not feature more strongly 
during the reform process, which culminated in the new Sexual Offences Act 
of 2007. Although there are differences between rape as an explicit strategy of 
war and ethnic cleansing as it was employed in the former Yugoslavian conflict, 
on the one hand, and the high levels of ‘everyday’ rape that happens in South 
Africa as a post-conflict society, on the other, there are also, scholars realise, 
important overlaps and insights that are transferable between pre-, post- and 
armed conflict contexts. It could arguably be demonstrated that South Africans 
have a long history of self-exceptionalism, in which the alleged uniqueness of 
South African circumstances (and later after liberation of South African autonomy 
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 vis-à-vis the West) have been used as rationalisations for resisting international 
pressure. Indeed, such resistance is tied up with legitimate struggles for self-
determination against ongoing pressures exerted by imperialist, neo-colonial and 
other globalising powers and interests. Yet, a blanket rejection of international 
pressure in the name of autonomy and self-determination and in the name of 
custom and tradition constitutes a kind of violence and closure – the kind of 
violence most typically challenged by the universal and moral thrust of human 
rights. It kills the promise of a better life just as surely as does an invasive war 
waged under the banner of humanitarianism.
3.2 Human rights in South Africa
How should South Africans then respond to international human rights and 
humanitarian frameworks and activities? Renowned South African legal 
philosopher Lourens du Plessis draws attention to the mixed reactions of the 
newly created Constitutional Court of South Africa to international and human 
rights frameworks. On the one hand, in the very first case handled by that Court, 
the Makwanyane case in which the constitutionality of the death penalty was 
contested, the Constitutional Court triumphantly declared the death penalty to 
be unconstitutional.4 They did this, not only in the name of the South African 
Constitution, but explicitly also in the name of human rights standards worldwide 
(Du Plessis 2000: 387). Du Plessis adds that two justices, Mokgoro and Madala JJ, 
went further than this and “solemnised a marriage of Western and African human 
rights values” with reference to Ubuntu (Du Plessis 2000: 387). Interestingly, 
among this and other “remarkable judgements” of the Constitutional Court which 
“have given short shrift to the remnants of long-cherished biases” on the basis of 
the newly celebrated human rights culture in the country, Du Plessis (2000: 388) 
lists rights and freedoms regarding gender and parental roles and prominently 
also gay and lesbian rights. There was thus, at least initially, great enthusiasm for 
the application of human rights standards to the opening up of sexual freedoms 
for all South Africans.
Following the work of Johan Snyman (1998) in this regard, Du Plessis 
distinguishes between a monumental and a memorial approach to the 
Constitution. The confident thrashing of “long-cherished biases”, held by 
the majority of South African citizens in the name of human rights, he calls a 
monumental moment of constitutional interpretation. He contrasts with this the 
memorial moment in constitutional interpretation where the emphasis is more 
on mourning (of past victims) than on triumph or celebration – echoing the ideas 
4 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC).
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of Shklar and Ignatieff discussed earlier. For Du Plessis, the memorial moment 
limits triumphant constitutionalism by allowing for a multiplicity of perspectives, 
for voices coming from concrete, local contexts, and for political contestation. In 
particular, Du Plessis is concerned that the voices of actual and potential victims 
of constitutional decisions should be more clearly aired and prioritised. This would 
mean, for example, in the case of the death penalty decision, that victims of violent 
crime should have ideally been given the chance to testify about the impact of 
criminal violence on their lives, thereby giving a voice to the majority of South 
Africans who seem to favour the return of the death penalty. At the same time, 
South Africans should have been reminded of the unsavoury political role that 
the death penalty had played in apartheid South Africa. These emphases imply a 
much more modest constitutionalism and, for Du Plessis, they give better effect 
than monumental constitutionalism to an “open community of constitutional 
interpreters”. One aspect of this latter notion is that the Constitution does not 
‘belong’ in any sense to the Constitutional Court, but that its promise along with 
its interpretation instead belongs to all South Africans.
One could thus plausibly link Du Plessis’ notion of monumental 
constitutionalism to the transcendent, universal aspiration of human rights, 
and thereby with their radical and disruptive potential and promise, which 
should clearly be protected. On the other hand, his understanding of memorial 
constitutionalism insists on the difficulty of deciding what a specific human 
rights claim should mean in any particular, concrete context; in other words, 
he acknowledges the difficulty of simultaneously keeping alive the promise of 
human rights and contextualising them, making them politically effective. Like 
Butler, Bergoffen and others discussed earlier, Du Plessis (2000: 385) makes a 
clear case for striking a constant, if dynamic, balance between the memorial and 
monumental moments of constitutional interpretation: 
the promise(s) which a constitution holds can only emerge 
from contradictory modes of dealing with that constitution 
as memory. In other words, the manner in which we deal with 
the Constitution as memory predetermines the fulfilment of 
the Constitution as pledge. The Constitution as memory is a 
monument and a memorial at the same time. In purpose and style 
these constitutional modes of existence are largely contradictory, 
but they need not necessarily exclude or eliminate each other.
Like Brown, Du Plessis is clearly uncomfortable with the persistent tendency 
to treat human rights as a purely moral category and thereby to de-politicise 
them. He dislikes the way in which the Constitutional Court adopts an a-political, 
“merely moral” human rights stance on certain issues, thereby denying that 
they in fact interfere politically, or that their actions have political effects and 
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 consequences in the sense of actually redistributing power. This was for him 
particularly striking in the Azapo case where the Constitutional Court resisted 
clear principles of international law in order to make what it considered to be 
strategic political moves by granting amnesty to apartheid perpetrators (Du 
Plessis 2007). This is doubly ironic since the Court then went on to defend its 
stance as motivated by morality alone, and to thereby be elevated above politics 
and political pressures, operating somehow from a pure moral realm beyond 
political considerations (Du Plessis 2007: 53). In doing so, the Constitutional Court 
insisted on the transcendent moment of human rights, without acknowledging 
the complexity of interpreting their meaning in context, i.e. their necessary 
immanence. We have seen time and again how global imperialist powers make 
a similar claim to neutrality and objectivity when they most glaringly serve their 
own power interests. Taken into extremes, memorialism and monumentalism 
may actually constitute the two opposing types of violence that Douzinas warns 
against: both tend toward the closure or fixation of the promise and disruption 
of human rights claims in an attempt to exert control over others. Whether the 
claim is one of the triumphant ‘realisation’ of human rights ignoring local protests 
and concerns or whether it is an opposition to human rights in the name of local 
‘political necessities’ that ‘require’ certain ‘sacrifices’ to be made, neither of 
these strategies respects the promise (and thus necessary transcendence) of any 
human rights claim worth its salt.
3.3 Human rights and sexual violence
In conclusion, let us focus more narrowly on the everydayness of sexual violence 
committed against women and girls in this country, and the promise contained 
in human rights discourse to put an end to it. I agree with Helen Moffett’s (2006) 
analysis, which shows that the debate and political constestations around sexual 
violence in South Africa get bogged down by a racialisation of the issue that 
occludes the fact that sexual violence is overwhelmingly intra-racial and intra-
communal, and an issue of sexual rather than racial power. Of course, nothing in 
our country is untouched by race dimensions and it would be naïve to assume 
that this is untrue for sexual identity and sexual violence. The history of the 
sexual dimension of colonial power in South Africa still needs to be researched 
extensively (see Thomas 2007). But what I see as happening is that the issue of 
sexual violence is/gets racialised so that it can then be pronounced too sensitive 
and thereby removed from public debate. Read in feminist terms, what we get is a 
dominant public strategy, which declares male honour to carry more weight than 
female bodily integrity and sexual freedom, in a context where racial stereotypes 
also impact on these different valuations. The wider frame in which I understand 
the passivity, the silence and the complicity around sexual violence in our country 
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is the clash in our context between the two global frames referred to earlier, both 
of which exert the violence of closure. On the one hand, there is the too western-
monopolised and US-dominated human rights framework which threatens 
indigenous traditions, because it treats human rights as immanent and, on the 
other, there are the ossified systems of control that are acknowledged as authentic 
and ‘traditionally African’ which resist those same immanentised human rights 
claims, often with no clear normative frame to put in their place. And of course, 
most typically, the clash between these two misogynist traditions chooses as its 
battleground women’s sexual bodies. Viewed from women’s perspective, these 
two interpretative frames that seem to oppose one another are, in fact, deeply 
complicit in maintaining women’s sexual un-freedom. Drawing on Douzinas, one 
could say this is because both are strongly invested in existing power distributions 
(one global, one local) and, therefore repress the radical potential of transcendent 
human rights claims in postcolonial contexts.
If the struggle for women’s sexual freedom and in particular their freedom 
from sexual violence in the South African postcolony is to be successful (without 
which the democracy is postponed and the liberation has not yet happened), it 
is crucial that we understand the nature of the beast that dominates the public 
discourse, as set out earlier. It is imperative that we understand the deeply 
paradoxical nature of human rights. It is important that women realise that 
neither of these two opposing agendas serve their interests and I suggest that it 
is crucial that women unite across race, class, ethnicity and religion in solidarity 
around issues of sexual violence and oppression in order to ensure that racial, 
class, religious and other agendas do not hijack the debate. The next step would 
be to insist on a link between, on the one hand, the promise and power contained 
in human rights discourse, which historically played a decisive role in our political 
transition in this country, and on the other, the power and authority of women to 
express what sexual freedom and the basic right to bodily integrity as promised in 
the Constitution mean in our local contexts, cultures and neighbourhoods. I thus 
propose that it is necessary to resist and refuse the tendency of the dominant 
discourses to force the sexual violence debate into a stalemate by pressing the 
issue into the service of national (or race or class) interests. 
Women (and their male allies) should insist on again and again returning this 
debate back to the question of what the basic human right to bodily integrity 
should and could mean when the proclamation of that right is allowed to critique 
and explode local interpretative frames that want to limit and contain its promise. 
The power of human rights should be mobilised in order to combat the often 
invisible cruelties committed against women in the everyday in the way that 
Ignatieff proposes, but then not by naively claiming to be ‘merely moral’, or to 
be minimalist and purely negative in their approach. It is a truism that, if you 
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 want to end the banal invasions of women’s bodies, the violent appropriation of 
their humanity through the subjection of their sexuality, it will require a radical 
redistribution of power (see MacKinnon 2005). It will be political and it cannot but 
be political, but we should not shy away from this. Not only will women and men 
in the process insist on and highlight the public-political nature of the pervasive 
‘private, sexual’ violence made possible by the current nature of the state and 
government structures, but they will also assume real political power for women 
(see Nedelsky 2011). At the same time, feminists would challenge western-
monopolised human rights frameworks by re-activating forgotten indigenous 
traditions of women’s sexual freedoms and autonomy, and would challenge local 
authorities to state in so many words that African traditions oppose women’s right 
to bodily integrity and autonomy, and to substantiate those claims. Also, claims 
to tradition will hereby be removed from the murky realms of the untouchable 
and the timeless, and brought into the living gathering of people, the lekgotla, 
where they belong, for scrutiny and reinterpretation, for inquiring rigorously 
about whether they (still) serve the flourishing of human life or not. Neither the 
promise of human rights nor the meanings of African traditions should be handed 
on a tray to powerful groups who have no real interest in women’s lives and 
consider the sacrifice of women’s sexuality to ‘higher causes’ as justifiable.
Finally, I want to draw attention to the close affinity between the proper 
transcendence of human rights claims and the imagination. Stories in all cultures 
have served the purpose of critiquing the violent closure of meanings and worked 
to open up avenues for thinking and acting differently. In a dynamic African past, 
which some contemporary individuals want to close down and freeze in time 
according to their own skewed interpretations, stories have played the same role. 
In a recent anthology, Jean Lombard (2014) from Cape Town collected numerous 
stories dealing with the legendary big Water Snake of the Groot Gariep – the largest 
and longest river in our country, winding its way through an arid landscape. What 
strikes the reader about this series of stories, a small selection out of a large 
multicultural tapestry of southern African stories about the Water Snake, is how 
the snake represents the male sexual organ, the Phallus, on the one hand, but how 
closely aligned the Water Snake is to women’s sexuality and women’s procreative 
powers, on the other. The Water Snake is the perfect example of what the ancient 
Greeks called the pharmakon: the medicine that could also be a poison, the deeply 
ambivalent phenomenon. The snake lives in the deepest hollows of the river – in a 
land where water is the most precious resource and the source of all life. The river 
itself is almost mythical, supernatural – a large body of water winding its way 
through a semi-desert. The Water Snake is closely associated with the river itself, 
and highlights both its life-saving and life-threatening aspects. The Water Snake 
carries a bright stone on its forehead, which it takes off and hides in the reeds 
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when it feeds. This stone is marvellous and enticing and brings riches to the one 
who can get hold of it. Yet, the same stone can act as a trap by which the snake 
can catch a person for prey. In some stories, the snake swallows all the water of 
a river or fountain so that the humans starve.
Also sexually speaking, the Water Snake is deeply ambivalent, representing 
both the pleasure and the dangers of sex itself. It is mostly regarded as 
straightforwardly threatening to men and boys – it eats them. But the snake has 
a more complex relation with women and girls. When girls reach puberty, it is 
customary in some cultures that the young girl (die maagmeisie) gets introduced 
ceremonially to the Water Snake – an acquaintance that is understood will 
empower her, especially in her womanly role of life-bearing (see Deacon in 
Lombard). In addition, in almost all of the stories recorded, ranging from Sotho to 
Xhosa to Griekwa cultures, the Water Snake seeks to marry a girl, to find a wife. It 
is said that once a woman has had intercourse with the snake, she will lose sexual 
interest in men. According to one story-teller, the woman ‘gets wise under the 
water’ and no man can give a woman the kind of pleasure that the snake can 
(Strauss in Lombard 2014: 39): “Ek en jy kan tog nie met haar gedoen kry wat 
die slang met haar gedoen het nie. Die slang gee haar ‘n anner soort lekkerte”. I 
read this as the kind of legend that plays an important corrective role in a male-
dominated society. In a world where male sexuality is constructed as dominant, 
stories of the Water Snake place emphasis on female sexuality – not only on its 
procreative and life-giving and life-sustaining aspects, but also, very importantly, 
on the female capacity for pleasure. The exaggerated, impossible pleasure that 
the Water Snake is capable of bestowing on his wife (or anyone’s wife!) acts as 
a reminder of women’s capacity and need for sexual pleasure, and the Snake, in 
its mythical proportions, embodies something transcendent, something which 
by its very nature pushes against the boundaries of the immanent, the given, 
the closed, the tradition and the custom. The Water Snake makes the impossible 
possible and stretches the imagination. It inspires awe, and serves as a reminder 
of how human sexuality is embedded in nature and how both its constructive and 
destructive powers ultimately transcend us.
In line with the thinking of Sylvia Tamale (2008), I also think it is strategically 
important to revisit African cultural traditions in an effort to deliberately work 
against “the totalising effect of obscuring the potential that culture may hold as an 
emancipatory tool” (Tamale 2008: 49). Tamale wants to pursue a “constructive 
approach to African sexual rights”, an approach that works through rather than 
against or around African culture, and I agree with this strategy. It is important 
that African feminists highlight both the positive, emancipatory as well as the 
negative and restrictive aspects of contemporary African cultures. From such a 
perspective, we, as African scholars, shall also be better placed to highlight both 
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 positive and negative aspects of contemporary Western cultures, where, as far 
as women’s sexual freedoms are concerned, there are also still many problems. 
We should consistently fight the stereotypes that portray, for example, Europe 
as completely woman-friendly when compared with ‘patriarchal, oppressive’ 
Africa. These pictures are purely and simply false.
Echoing the two South African Constitutional Court judges referred to earlier, 
Tamale (2008: 60) asks that we must “find those values that resonate from 
indigenous cultures that will speak to the rights repertoire, as feminists know it” 
and build our case that way. Through her investigation into the Baganda cultural 
practice of Ssenga (sexual initiation of a girl by the paternal aunt), Tamale discovers 
not an outdated, static and oppressive practice as African cultures are usually 
portrayed, but a practice that has adapted to changing realities such as HIV and 
AIDS, and which now serves to help young Baganda women “negotiate agency, 
autonomy and self-knowledge about their sexuality”, as well as their sexual 
autonomy and economic independence. As in the Water Snake stories of South 
Africa, we find in Ssenga an emphasis on women’s sexual pleasure. According 
to Tamale (2008: 62), these young African women are empowered through a 
contemporary version of sexual initiation into using “the erotic as an empowering 
resource to claim justice”. In the midst of the real, empowering new possibilities 
are opened up through a redescription, a reimagination of the world. What young 
girl raised in the West can lay claim to this kind of sexual empowerment through 
cultural initiation?
To return to the question which is the title of this article, the current profile 
of human rights, narrowly associated with Judaeo-Christian legal traditions and, 
increasingly, with liberal individualism and the gradual capitalist destruction of 
the political sphere, probably constitutes more of a foe than a friend to African 
women’s sexual freedom aspirations. On the other hand, they may still prove 
to be (even if in a somewhat transformed guise or form) an indispensable ally. 
Something like them (in their imaginative power to inspire and empower by 
picturing things otherwise than they are; ‘it was and it was not the case’) may 
very well be necessary to leverage critique against ossified, closed systems that 
resist calls for change and that insist on only one correct (resolutely patriarchal) 
reading of the African past, against systems that kill stories and the possibility to 
imagine things wildly differently. Just as African tradition is open to interpretation 
and contestation, human rights should be, too. We should probably not conceive 
of human rights as absolutes or irreplaceables. We should rather focus on the kind 
of stories that human rights at their best allow us to tell. They allow us to consider 
a world in which women’s sexuality is celebrated and revered, women’s sexual 
pleasure cultivated, and there are real sanctions placed on anyone violating 
them. They allow us to say in our context: “We simultaneously have and do not 
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have an equal moral right to sexual integrity and autonomy”, but not to blow 
this message into the wind; rather, they also help to create an audience who 
could ‘catch’ that story, echo it, and help to give birth to the world evoked by it. 
Should we dare to once again let loose the spirit of the Water Snake on the South 
African landscape? Allow the poison of the snake to do its healing, its protective 
as well as its destructive work? Can the Water Snake of a truly transcendent, but 
at the same time materially embedded (in the boegoe and the clay of the Groot 
Gariep) human rights discourse help us embrace the risks of an uncertain future 
of sexual freedom for all? Can we call again on the Water Snake to revitalise an 
indigenous tradition of sexual freedom and celebration, and to “discover and fight 
for transcendence within immanence”, as Douzinas suggests?
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